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FRANCO I LOVED: RECONCILING THE TWO HALVES
OF THE NATION’S ONLY GOVERNMENT-FUNDED
PUBLIC DEFENDER PROGRAM FOR IMMIGRANTS
Amelia Wilson ∗
Abstract: Detained noncitizens experiencing serious intellectual and mental health
disabilities are among the most vulnerable immigrant populations in the United States. The
Executive Office for Immigration Review’s (EOIR) creation of the National Qualified
Representative Program (NQRP) following a class action lawsuit was an important step in
finally bringing meaningful protections to this population. The EOIR pledged to ensure
government-paid counsel for those facing removal who had been adjudicated “incompetent”
by an immigration judge, as well as other protections for those who had been identified as
having a “serious mental disorder” but who had not yet been found incompetent. The NQRP
is the first of its kind, and the only appointed counsel apparatus in the immigration court
system.
The year 2023 will mark the NQRP’s tenth anniversary. While the program has expanded
significantly over the past decade and seen an increase in federal funding, it continues to be
plagued by serious limitations, gaps, and due process defects. I should know. I ran the program
from 2016 to 2018.
Some of the NQRP’s failings are embedded in the program’s architecture and have
therefore existed since its inception; other inequities flow from the evolution of the NQRP over
time, and in particular, the development of its two-tiered system of classification of detained
noncitizens within the Ninth Circuit, versus those outside of it. The program’s deficiencies
impact the due process rights—and safety—of the incompetent respondents the program
pledged to safeguard; they also force many legal service providers to make ethically fraught
choices as they navigate representation of their clients. And finally, the NQRP’s shortcomings
reduce judicial economy and inadvertently create an unequal administration of justice within
our immigration courts.
In this article, I closely examine data, training material, and federal contract information
obtained through two Freedom of Information Act Requests to expose critical distinctions
between Franco and the Nationwide Policy. I then explain why the differences matter, and
what consequences flow to respondents, their attorneys, and the immigration courts.
Finally, I make several recommendations for how to resolve the NQRP’s inequities and
weaknesses. The first set of recommendations can be implemented now as EOIR enters into a
new federal contractor relationship for management of the NQRP’s nationwide operations. The
second set can be instituted at any time, as they are internal EOIR policy decisions that do not
require Congressional approval.
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II.

INTRODUCTION
Immigrants facing deportation are not guaranteed an attorney before
our immigration courts. Many noncitizens cannot afford an attorney and
have to fight their case alone—and worse still, they must do so while
detained. Immigration detention inflicts grievous harm on the mental
health and wellbeing of detainees. 1 It also decreases the likelihood that a
detainee will be able to secure critical evidence, witnesses, and
information needed to mount a meaningful defense against removal. 2
These cascading disadvantages are felt more acutely by detained
1. Janet Cleveland, Rachel Kronick & Cécile Roussea, Symbolic Violence and Disempowerment as
Factors in the Adverse Impact of Immigration Detention on Adult Asylum Seekers’ Mental Health, 63
INT’L J. PUBLIC HEALTH 1001 (2018).
2. Karen Berberich, Annie Chen & Emily Tucker, The Case for Universal Representation (Dec.
2018),
https://www.vera.org/advancing-universal-representation-toolkit/the-case-for-universalrepresentation-1/the-problem [https://perma.cc/JEY3-NBSR] (“It is extraordinarily difficult to gather
evidence in support of one’s legal case from the confines of detention. Without internet access and
with telephone access that is both expensive and highly restricted, it can be challenging—often
impossible—for detained immigrants to obtain documents from other countries. These documents
may include police reports, hospital records, local news articles, supporting affidavits, and certificates
of birth, marriage, or death: the kind of evidence that is critical to securing release from detention on
bond while the case is pending or establishing a defense to deportation”).
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noncitizens living with serious intellectual and mental health disabilities. 3
Until recently, this particularly vulnerable population was far less likely
to receive the assistance of counsel as they navigated our labyrinthine
immigration laws, more likely to experience prolonged detention and the
attendant injuries caused by detention, and more likely to be ordered
deported—sometimes to places where they faced persecution, torture, and
death. 4
The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) created the
National Qualified Representative Program (NQRP) in 2013 5 following
the seminal class action lawsuit in the Ninth Circuit, Franco-Gonzalez v.
Holder. 6 EOIR pledged to provide government-paid counsel to detained
persons adjudicated “mentally incompetent” by an immigration judge
following a Judicial Competency Inquiry (JCI). 7 It also promised to offer
protections for those identified as having a serious mental disorder but not
yet found incompetent, such as bond hearings and referrals to independent
mental health professionals for psychological evaluations. 8
The NQRP represented a revolutionary and important first step in
bringing meaningful protections to a uniquely vulnerable population. It
was also the first (and to this day, only) appointed counsel mechanism for
any noncitizen group in removal proceedings. 9 At the writing of this piece,
3. See Martha von Werthern, Katy Robjant, Zoe Chui, Rachel Schon, Livia Ottisova, Claire Mason
& Cornelius Katona, The Impact of Immigration Detention on Mental Health: A Systematic Review,
BMC
PSYCHIATRY
382,
391
(2018),
https://doi.org/10.1186/s12888-018-1945-y
[https://perma.cc/ZHL9-M44G]; see also Leslie Wolf, After Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder: The
Implications of Locating a Right to Counsel Under the Rehabilitation Act, 23 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC.
JUST. 329, 338–39 (2014)
4. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & ACLU, DEPORTATION BY DEFAULT: MENTAL DISABILITY,
UNFAIR HEARINGS, AND INDEFINITE DETENTION IN THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 46, 7–8, 53–56
(2010),
https://www.aclu.org/report/deportation-default-mental-disability-unfair-hearings-andindefinite-detention-us-immigration [https://perma.cc/J98U-22RV] (detailing the elevated challenges
that mentally ill noncitizens face in accessing and securing counsel).
5. See EOIR Policy Memorandum from Brian O’Leary, Chief Immigr. Judge, U.S. Dep’t of Just.
Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., Nationwide Policy to Provide Enhanced Procedural Protections to
Unrepresented Detained Aliens with Serious Mental Disorders or Conditions (Apr. 22, 2013).
6. Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10–02211, 2013 WL 3674492 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
7. See EOIR Policy Memorandum, supra note 5.
8. Id.
9. Gregory Pleasants, National Qualified Representative Program, VERA INST. OF JUST.,
https://craft2.vera.org/projects/national-qualified-representative-program/learn-more
[https://perma.cc/7S5E-L6K9] (“The NQRP is the first program in the United States to provide
appointed legal representation at the federal government’s expense to a specific vulnerable population
facing deportation”); see Ingrid Eagly, Access to Justice for Immigrants: A Lecture Presented in
Memory
of
Breanna
Boss,
92
Colorado
L.
Rev.
Forum
1,
6,
https://lawreview.colorado.edu/digital/access-to-justice-for-immigrants-a-lecture-presented-inmemory-of-breanna-boss/, [https://perma.cc/9AVZ-2DFN] (identifying the NQRP and one other
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not even immigrant children appearing in front of an immigration judge
are afforded this guarantee. 10 However, serious due process concerns
hobble the NQRP and imperil the program’s original stated mission of
safeguarding vulnerable respondents and promoting the efficacy and
smooth administration of our immigration courts.
We are now approaching the NQRP’s tenth anniversary. 11 In that short
time, it has provided court-appointed counsel and other critical services to
over 2,100 detained immigrants with mental health concerns 12—and is
active in every detained court in the United States. 13 It has managed to
achieve these praiseworthy achievements thanks in large part to the
contributions of its primary federal contractor, the Vera Institute of
Justice. 14 Since the NQRP’s inception, the Vera Institute of Justice
(hereinafter “Vera”) has managed many of the program’s operations
including the identification, onboarding, training and management of the
subcontracting service providers who represent the respondents in their
immigration proceedings after they have been adjudicated incompetent. 15
now-ended program—justice AmeriCorps, which operated from 2015–2017—as the only
government-funded appointed counsel programs); see also Am. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Immigr.,
Summary of the justice AmeriCorps Legal Services for Unaccompanied Children Program (2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/immigration/resources/justice-americorpslegal-services-for-unaccompanied-children-pro/ [https://perma.cc/U6VB-TWV2] (“The program
was administered from January 1, 2015 to August 31, 2017 through the Department of Justice’s
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) and the Corporation for National & Community
Service (CNCS)”).
10. See Class Action Complaint, F.L.B. v. Lynch, No. 2:14-cv-01026, 2014 WL 3753431 (W.D.
Wash. July 9, 2014); see generally Amanda Kavita Sewanan, The Right to Appointed Counsel: The
Case for Unaccompanied Immigrant Children, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 317, 324 (2019).
11. National Qualified Representative Program (NQRP), U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR
IMMIGR. REV. (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/national-qualified-representativeprogram-nqrp [https://perma.cc/X2FS-VABY] (dating the program’s inception back to April 2013).
12. Michael Corradini, National Qualified Representative Program, VERA INST. OF JUST.,
https://www.vera.org/projects/national-qualified-representative-program [https://perma.cc/ANR92QHC] (“From its beginning in 2013 through January 2020, the NQRP has provided representation
to over 2,000 detained immigrants with serious mental illness”).
13. Id. (“Through a nationwide network of nearly 50 legal service providers, the NQRP provides
zealous, person-centered representation to its clients at any Immigration Court in the country.”); see
also EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., SECOND FOIA REQUEST RESPONSE TO THE HARV. IMMIGR. &
REFUGEE CLINICAL PROGRAM (Mar. 29, 2021) (on file with author) (showing a total of 2,113 QR
assignments between April 24, 2013, and January 2021).
14. The Vera Institute of Justice is a leading nationwide organization committed to ending mass
incarceration, ensuring due process for immigrants, and promoting healthy communities through
research and advocacy. About Us, VERA INST. OF JUST., https://www.vera.org/who-we-are/about-us
[https://perma.cc/6TQF-YZAS] (last visited July 20, 2022).
15. Gregory Pleasants, National Qualified Representative Program, VERA INST. OF JUST.,
https://craft2.vera.org/projects/national-qualified-representative-program/learn-more
[https://perma.cc/AM4H-SNFP] (“In 2014, EOIR contracted with Vera to set up program services
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However, Vera’s involvement in the NQRP is soon coming to an end.
On August 4, 2021, Vera announced via email to its entire provider
network that it would not be recompeting for the NQRP contract. 16 The
contract is set to end July 31, 2022. 17
As Vera’s time draws to a close, scholars have an opportunity to take
an intimate look at how the NQRP has functioned during the ten years of
Vera’s involvement. Recently obtained internal government documents
accessed through two Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests
yielded a trove of programmatic information related to the NQRP. 18 The
FOIA results show that the NQRP evolved and expanded considerably
over the past ten years. They also illuminate the genesis and ossification
of some of the program’s key failings as the NQRP split into two halves:
one half for detainees whose cases originated inside of the Ninth Circuit
(hereinafter “Franco”), and another for those whose cases originated
outside of the Ninth Circuit (hereinafter the “Nationwide Policy”).
There is a window of opportunity to address some of the NQRP’s
shortcomings as the program ushers in a new major programmatic partner.
This article urges several of those changes, which could take effect
immediately and would have far-reaching, positive effects for
respondents, their attorneys, and the courts.
Part I of this article provides cursory background information on the
Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder litigation in order to contextualize the creation
of the NQRP. Part II isolates and examines some of the FOIA results—in
particular, EOIR’s and Vera’s compensation fee structures that covered
attorney rates, case funding caps, expert fees, and post-release funding, as
well as internal immigration court training data and materials—to expose
and identify several of the key distinctions between the NQRP’s fraternal
twins, Franco and the Nationwide Policy.
Part III explores the consequences that flow to respondents, their
attorneys, and the immigration courts seated in the two jurisdictions.
Specifically, the bifurcated system of identification, processing, and
training is riddled with due process and liberty inequities for respondents
and to provide training, technical support, and program analysis”); see also Memorandum from Vera
Inst. of Just. on Proposal for National Qualified Representative Program (QRP) (Dec. 20, 2013) (on
file with author).
16. E-mail from Anne Marie Mulcahy, Dir., Vera Inst. of Just., to “NQRPnetwork@groups.io”
(Aug. 4, 2021, 2:15 PM EST) (on file with author).
17. Id.
18. The first FOIA was filed in January 2019 by an immigration law practitioner in Kansas,
Hoppock Law Firm. See Matthew Hoppock, FOIA Results – EOIR’s “Guidance and Publications”
Site, HOPPOCK LAW FIRM (Sept. 13, 2021), https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/foia-results-eoirsguidance-and-publications-site/ [https://perma.cc/F6WJ-VALH]; the second FOIA was filed on
October 21, 2020, by the Harvard Immigration & Refugee Clinical Program (on file with author).
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outside of Franco’s ambit. Non-Franco respondents are held in ICE
custody longer, are not provided an individualized custody review, and
are not guaranteed counsel throughout the pendency of their removal
proceedings. Funding restrictions force lawyers practicing within the
Nationwide Policy framework to make ethically problematic choices and
limit the scope of their representation, contravening their fiduciary duty
to their client. And finally, the two-tiered system frustrates the
immigration courts by prolongating cases and creating inefficiencies
during an era when the courts are sagging under a historic backlog.
Part IV provides recommendations for discreet adjustments to the
NQRP that would resolve many of the major inequities. Specifically, I
urge EOIR to bring the Nationwide Policy into alignment with Franco in
terms of funding, bond hearings, immigration judge training, NQRP class
membership identification, and case processing obligations. Such actions
could be implemented immediately as the agency heads into a new
contract agreement. Other changes are not contract-specific, but rather are
a matter of internal EOIR policy that can (and should) also be adopted at
any time.
These recommendations are not exhaustive. Nor does aligning the
Nationwide Policy with Franco address the inherent problems already
present in Franco as a whole—which are myriad and complicated, but
which fall outside the article’s narrow scope. True and complete
protection for noncitizens with mental health disabilities would require
universal representation for all immigrants, an end to our overly
cumbersome competency evaluation process, and an end to ICE detention.
I.

BRIEF CONTEXTUALIZING OF FRANCO-GONZALEZ V.
HOLDER AND THE RISE OF THE NQRP

Deportation from the United States has long been considered a civil
penalty rather than a criminal punishment. 19 Respondents in removal
proceedings are not entitled to the same constitutional rights as defendants
in a criminal trial—such as counsel at the government’s expense. 20
Nevertheless, removal proceedings must still comport with the doctrine of
19. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“The order of deportation is
not a punishment for crime . . . . He has not, therefore, been deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; and the provisions of the constitution, securing the right of trial by jury,
and prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and cruel and unusual punishments, have no
application.” (emphasis added)).
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (“In any removal proceedings before an immigration judge and in any appeal
proceedings before the Attorney General from any such removal proceedings, the person concerned
shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government) by such counsel,
authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose.” (emphasis added)).
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fundamental fairness and due process guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. 21 Moreover, the
immigration courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) (which
fall under the Department of Justice) have an affirmative obligation to
make reasonable modifications in “policies, practices, and procedures” to
ensure that persons with disabilities have meaningful access to services
and programs under the Rehabilitation Act. 22
Prior to Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, a tiny constellation of federal
regulations 23 and one BIA decision from 2011 called In re M-A-M- 24
provided the bulk of the guidance on how immigration judges (IJs) should
proceed where a respondent lacked—or possibly lacked—mental
competence. In re M-A-M- provided the first ever test for determining
competence in immigration proceedings, 25 as well as suggestions on
possible accommodations an IJ could implement to make the proceedings
“fair.” 26
Following the 2011 M-A-M- decision, IJs started holding looselystructured and unstandardized competency inquiries—commonly referred
to as “M-A-M- hearings.” 27 However, nothing in In re M-A-M- explicitly
21. Shaughnessey v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (holding that
“traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law” govern immigration
proceedings).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); 28 C.F.R. § 39.130 (applying the Rehabilitation Act to the Department of
Justice).
23. See 8 C.F.R. § 103.8(c)(2)(ii) (service of a Notice to Appear upon an incompetent noncitizen is
only proper where effectuated in person upon someone with whom the individuals resides, and when
possible, a near relative, guardian, committee or friend); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c) (forbidding
immigration judges from accepting an admission of removability from a pro se, unaccompanied
respondent who lacks competence); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.4, 1240.43 (permitting waiver of a respondent’s
presence where, for reasons of incompetency, it is impracticable for the respondent to be present).
24. In re M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474 (BIA 2011) (providing the first ever guidance for
immigration judges to identify possible incompetence, evaluate a respondent’s competence, and
proscribe safeguards where required to comport with fundamental fairness).
25. Id. at 479 (“Therefore, the test for determining whether an alien is competent to participate in
immigration proceedings is whether he or she has a rational and factual understanding of the nature
and object of the proceedings, can consult with the attorney or representative if there is one, and has
a reasonable opportunity to examine and present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.”).
26. Id. at 478 (“If an Immigration Judge determines that a respondent lacks sufficient competency
to proceed with the hearing, the Immigration Judge will evaluate which available measures would
result in a fair hearing. Immigration Judges ‘shall prescribe safeguards to protect the rights and
privileges of the alien.’”).
27. See generally Amelia Wilson & Natalie H. Prokop, Applying Method to the Madness: The Right
to Court Appointed Guardians Ad Litem and Counsel for the Mentally Ill in Immigration Proceedings,
16 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (2013) (discussing at length an uneven, inconsistent application
among IJs of In re M-A-M- to unrepresented respondents); see also Cassandra H. Chee, Rehabilitating
Our Immigration System with the Rehabilitation Act: Rejecting Video Teleconferencing and
Presumptively Requiring in-Person Court Appearances as a Reasonable Accommodation for
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authorized IJs to appoint counsel following an incompetency
adjudication. 28
Then came the quantum leap that was Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, the
class action lawsuit and subsequent permanent injunction 29 that
seismically altered the landscape for detained respondents in removal
proceedings with mental health concerns.
In Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, the American Civil Liberties Union of
Southern California and other service providers filed suit in the Central
District of California against the Department of Homeland Security and
the Department of Justice on behalf of Jose Antonio Franco-Gonzalez.
Mr. Franco had lived with serious cognitive disabilities his entire life. 30
An immigration judge felt that it was unfair to proceed against him
without an attorney and closed his case, but such administrative closure
did not require that ICE release him. 31 Mr. Franco then languished for
nearly five years in various Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE)
detention centers throughout Southern California without a hearing. 32
The district court agreed to certify a class to include other noncitizens
throughout ICE detention centers in Arizona, California, and Washington
who were also without counsel, facing removal, and living with serious
mental health concerns. 33 The class then branched into two subclasses:
Subclass-1, whose members had been found incompetent following a
formal competency hearing, and Subclass-2, whose members were
incompetent and had been detained for more than six months. 34
The district court ruled that an IJ’s formation of a “bona fide doubt”
Mentally Incompetent Detainees, 70 Am. U.L. Rev. 665, 713, 716, 721 (2020) (referring to
competency hearings that flow from Matter of M-A-M- as “Matter of M-A-M- hearings”).
28. See JAMES F. MCCARTHY, III & BRIANNA EVANS, DETERMINING MENTAL COMPETENCE &
SAFEGUARDS & PROTECTIONS 13 (Apr. 5–23, 2021) (on file with the author) (“Actions an IJ Cannot
Take Under M-A-M- . . . Order the appointment of a government-funded attorney or representative to
represent respondent”).
29. Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10–02211, 2013 WL 3674492 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. First Amended Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus at 11, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 10-CV-02211 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2010),
https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/franco-gonzales-et-al-v-holder-et-al-first-amended-classaction-complaint (“Despite the fact that there were no open removal proceedings against him, Mr.
Franco remained incarcerated for approximately four and a half years”); see also Joseph Serna, ICE
Detainees Are Released, DAILY PILOT (Southern California) (Mar. 31, 2010),
https://www.latimes.com/socal/daily-pilot/news/tn-dpt-xpm-2010-03-31-dpt-gonzalez040110story.html [https://perma.cc/QPS2-YMJT].
33. Third Amended Class-Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-2211, 2011 WL 12677104 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 25, 2011).
34. Id. at ¶¶ 144–45.
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that a respondent was possibly incompetent immediately placed the
respondent in Franco class membership. 35 A respondent would also be
placed in Franco class membership if ICE identified a serious mental
health issue during one of its compulsory health screenings. 36 Both an IJ
and ICE were expected to accept any and all relevant information related
to an individual’s mental status, including information from third
parties. 37 Franco class membership and its attendant protections adhered
from the moment the individual was identified until their proceedings
concluded through either relief or removal, 38 even if they were released
from custody or were transferred outside the Ninth Circuit. 39 ICE could
not remove that individual or proceed against them until the competency
question was resolved.
The order also set strict deadlines for when each defendant had to
perform its obligations. For example, an IJ had to conduct a Judicial
Competency Inquiry (JCI) within twenty-one days of notification that a
detainee met the main class membership. 40 Then, if the IJ found that the
class member was incompetent to proceed, EOIR had sixty days from the
date of the determination to ensure that a Qualified Representative had

35. Order Further Implementing this Court’s Permanent Injunction at 6–7 , Franco-Gonzalez v.
Holder, No. CV-10-02211 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 2014) (“For purposes of this Order, unrepresented
immigration detainees are members of the Class certified in this case . . . if . . . (iii) an Immigration
Judge finds that the evidence of record results in a bona fide doubt about the detainee’s competency
to represent him- or herself.”).
36. Id. (“For purposes of this Order, unrepresented immigration detainees are members of the Class
certified in this case . . . if . . . (i) a qualified mental health provider determines the detainee meets
one or both of the following criteria . . . [or] (ii) a qualified mental health provider otherwise
diagnoses the detainee as demonstrating significant symptoms of one of the following . . . .”).
37. Id. at 8–9, 19 (“ICE and detention facility personnel must accept relevant information and
documents from family members, social workers, or treatment providers regarding detainees’ mental
disorders or conditions . . .” and “[a]t or before Judicial Competency Inquiries and Competency
Reviews, the ICE Office of the Chief Counsel, the Class member, and third parties (including family
members, social service providers, and others) may submit to the Immigration Judge, and the
Immigration Judge shall consider, additional mental health information or other information relevant
to a detainee’s mental competency or incompetency to represent him- or herself in immigration
proceedings.”) (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 3 (“Any Class member who has entered ICE custody after November 21, 2011, and who
is subsequently transferred outside of Arizona, California or Washington, continues to be a Class
member and entitled to all of the benefits of Class membership during the course of their immigration
proceedings, including those in the Permanent Injunction [Doc. # 593] and in this Order.”).
39. Id. at 23 (“Released Sub-Class One members are entitled to representation by Qualified
Representatives pursuant to this Court’s Injunction until the conclusion of their immigration
proceedings, irrespective of whether their case is transferred to a venue outside of the three states in
which this Order applies.”).
40. Id. at 15 (“The Immigration Judge shall convene a Judicial Competency Inquiry no later than
21 days after receiving the notice pursuant to Section II.B that a detainee is a member of the Main
Class.”).
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begun representation of the respondent. 41
The district court’s Implementation Order created a mechanism to
assist IJs who, at the conclusion of a JCI, remained unsure whether a
respondent was incompetent. They could order that an independent mental
health professional perform a Forensic Competency Evaluation (FCE). 42
The timing for when an IJ should order the FCE was more vague, stating
only that it had to be ordered “promptly.” 43 The report needed to be
completed within forty-five days following the IJ’s evaluation order. 44
The IJ then had no more than thirty days to convene again for a
Competency Review, at the conclusion of which the IJ was compelled to
make a formal ruling as to whether the class member is incompetent. 45
EOIR had only twenty-one days to provide an incompetent class member
with a QR after a Competency Review. 46 And finally, if the incompetent
respondent had been detained for more than 180 days (i.e., the respondent
was a Subclass-2 member) the court was required to provide the
individual a bond hearing within fifteen days—and with a QR by their
side. 47
Perhaps to manage the many timing obligations set forth by the district
court in Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder’s Implementation Order, EOIR
would go on to introduce flowcharts and visual aids into its training
material for court staff and judges that laid out the timelines. 48
41. Id. at 17 (“EOIR shall have 60 days from the date of the [incompetency] determination to
arrange for provision of a Qualified Representative.”).
42. Id. at 17 (“When, at the conclusion of the Judicial Competency Inquiry, an Immigration Judge
determines that he or she has insufficient evidence to determine if the Class member is competent
pursuant to III.B.5.c, supra, the Immigration Judge shall . . . order that a Forensic Competency
Evaluation of the Class member be conducted . . . .”).
43. Id. (“Upon the conclusion of the Judicial Competency Inquiry, the Immigration Judge shall
promptly order that a Forensic Competency Evaluation of the Class member be conducted and that
the results of the evaluation be provided to the Immigration Judge, the ICE Office of the Chief
Counsel, and the Class member.”).
44. Id. (“A Forensic Competency Evaluation ordered by the Immigration Judge shall be completed
and a written report provided to the Judge and the parties within 45 days after the date of the
order . . . .”).
45. Id. (“Within 30 days after receiving the report from the Forensic Competency Evaluation, the
Immigration Judge shall convene a Competency Review, including further testimony if necessary,
and shall make a determination by a preponderance of the evidence as to whether the Class member
is mentally competent or incompetent to represent him- or herself.”).
46. Id. (“EOIR shall have 21 days from the date of the determination to arrange for provision of a
Qualified Representative.”).
47. Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. CV 10-02211, 2013 WL 3674492 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013).
48. See, e.g., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., FRANCO-GONZALEZ V. HOLDER COMPETENCE
EVALUATION SYSTEM IN IMMIGRATION COURT, https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/Competence-Evaluation-Flow-Chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/R767-H2MQ]
(last updated Jan. 20, 2015); see also EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., CASE COMPETENCY TAB
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On the eve of the district court’s decision in Franco, EOIR’s Chief
Immigration Judge published a memorandum announcing that, by the end
of that year, the agency would be implementing a new system for the
treatment of cases involving potential incompetency of detained,
unrepresented respondents. 49 The new system would: 1) mandate
competency hearings for unrepresented, detained respondents who may
have a serious mental health condition; 2) make mental competency
examinations available to IJs unable to determine competency from a
competency hearing alone; 3) make available a “qualified legal
representative” for detained respondents who have been adjudicated
incompetent; and 4) give bond hearings to incompetent respondents who
have been detained six months or more. 50
As promised, EOIR unveiled its master plan on December 31 of that
year. 51 The accouchement was entitled “Phase I of Plan to Provide
Enhanced Procedural Protections to Unrepresented Detained Respondents
with Mental Disorders” (hereinafter “Phase I”). 52
Phase I mirrored the district court’s order in Franco in many important
ways: the competency standard was identical to the one laid out in the
district court’s order; 53 a QR would be provided to any detained,
unrepresented respondent who had been adjudicated incompetent
following a JCI; 54 if an immigration judge was still uncertain of a
respondent’s competency following the JCI, they could order a Forensic
Competency Evaluation. 55 Absent from Phase I, however, were the timing
FLOWCHART, https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Case-CompetencyTab-Flowchart.pdf [https://perma.cc/4E82-P9D2] (last updated Sept. 29, 2016).
49. See EOIR Policy Memorandum, supra note 5.
50. Id.
51. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., PHASE I OF PLAN TO PROVIDE ENHANCED PROCEDURAL
PROTECTIONS TO UNREPRESENTED DETAINED RESPONDENTS WITH MENTAL DISORDERS (Dec. 31,
2013) [hereinafter EOIR Guidance], https://immigrationreports.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/eoirphase-i-guidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/B6Z9-HMCL].
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2 (laying out under the Phase I competency standard, a respondent must have a rational
and factual understanding of the proceedings; and be able to make informed decisions about whether
to waive their rights, respond to allegations and charges, present information and evidence relevant
to eligibility for relief, and act upon instructions and information presented by the IJ and government
counsel).
54. Id. at 6 (providing that an IJ will “request provision of a qualified representative, and ensure
appropriate safeguards and protections are put in place” upon concluding that a respondent is not
competent).
55. Id. at 7 (“Where, at the conclusion of the judicial inquiry, the judge has ‘reasonable cause’ to
believe that the respondent is suffering from a mental disorder but needs additional evidence to
determine whether the presumption of competence is rebutted, the judge will schedule a hearing to
collect and review evidence of competency. It is at this stage that the judge will consider whether to
refer the respondent for a mental health examination to inform the court’s decision on competency.”).
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requirements. Also absent were the words “bond hearing.”
EOIR then had to envision, design, scaffold, staff, and implement the
entire system it promised in its April Phase I memo—and it had to do so
in less than eight months. On December 20, 2013, Vera submitted its
proposal and operation plan for providing legal representation under the
NQRP. 56 Vera committed to providing defense counsel to “all
unrepresented individuals detained by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and in [Immigration and Nationality Act] Section 240
immigration proceedings who are determined by EOIR to be mentally
incompetent to represent themselves in their immigration proceedings.” 57
In this way, EOIR and Vera joined efforts to build the NQRP. 58
II.

PEERING INTO THE NQRP’S SPLIT PERSONALITY

While Franco and the Nationwide Policy originally embodied similar
structures, the fraternal twins underwent divergent evolutions. This
section traces their lineage by examining programmatic, training, and
internal documents.
A.

Termination of Funding for Nationwide Policy Cases: The “90
Day” Clause

A significant divergence between Franco and the Nationwide Policy
occurred early on, when the Nationwide Policy was placed under funding
restrictions connected to the client’s detention status that did not apply to
Franco cases.
Programmatic documents show that, at least briefly, both Franco and
the Nationwide Policy contained a clause that terminated EOIR’s case
funding ninety calendar days after an NQRP respondent’s release from
ICE custody. 59 The earliest identified Statement of Work (SOW)
agreement between EOIR and Vera was dated December 13, 2013, and
applied to three NQRP locations: one Franco location (the Otay Mesa
detention center in San Diego, California) and two Nationwide Policy

56. Memorandum from Vera Inst. of Just., supra note 15.
57. Id. at 1.
58. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., NAT’L QUALIFIED REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM, STATEMENT
3 (Dec. 13, 2013) (on file with author).

OF WORK

59. Memorandum from Vera Inst. of Just. on Proposal for National Qualified Representative
Program (QRP) app. C at 3 (Dec. 20, 2013) (on file with author) (requiring a San Diego Franco QR
provider and an Aurora, Colorado Nationwide Policy QR provider to describe their organization’s
capacity to facilitate pro bono assistance to those “who are no longer eligible for services under the
contract (usually because the person has been released from DHS custody before his or her case is
complete)” (emphasis added)).
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locations (the Krome Service Processing Facility in Miami, Florida, and
the Aurora Contract Detention Facility in Aurora, Colorado). 60 In it,
contract funds ended “90 calendar days from the date of release from DHS
custody” for those with active cases, and thirty calendar days after the date
of release for those whose cases had concluded. 61
The only way to extend case funding past the ninety days was for a QR
to make a motion before the immigration judge to withdraw as counsel of
record on the basis that funding was ending, and for that motion to be
denied. 62
Within little time, however, the ninety-day funding provision
disappeared from the language found within SOWs for Franco-specific
NQRP providers—but remained for the Nationwide Policy providers. In
an SOW dated February 5, 2014, entitled “Statement of Work (Franco
Version)” between EOIR and an NQRP subcontractor in Los Angeles, no
reference is made to release from DHS custody as a condition causing a
termination of funding. 63 The ninety-day funding limitation for Franco
providers is explicitly removed in an updated service contract between
Vera and EOIR dated September 22, 2014: “As a general matter, Contract
funds may be used to provide Contract services to a Franco Identified
Individual whose covered immigration proceedings remain ongoing,
regardless of the DHS detention status of the Franco Identified
Individual.” 64
Contrast that with a September 23, 2014, SOW that controlled the
NQRP programs in Miami, El Paso, Houston, and Denver. That SOW
states:
Upon an Identified Individual’s release from DHS custody, and
regardless of the status or posture of the Identified Individual’s
immigration proceedings at the time of release, Contract funds are
available to provide Contract services to that Identified Individual
for up to 90 days from the date of the Identified Individual’s
release from DHS custody. 65
60. STATEMENT OF WORK at 3, supra note 58.
61. Id. at 4–5.
62. Id. at 5 (“In any case where the Identified Individual’s Qualified Representative has properly
moved to withdraw from representation before the Immigration Court or BIA, and that motion is
denied, Contract funds may continue.”).
63. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., CONTRACT TO PROVIDE LEGAL REPRESENTATION SERVICES,
STATEMENT OF WORK (FRANCO VERSION) 5 (Feb. 5, 2014) (on file with author).
64. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., NAT’L QUALIFIED REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM, STATEMENT
OF WORK APP. A: PROGRAM SERVICES REQUIRED UNDER FRANCO GONZALEZ V. HOLDER 6 (Sept. 22,
2014) (emphasis added) (on file with author).
65. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., NAT’L QUALIFIED REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM STATEMENT OF
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The ninety-day termination clause appears annually in each
Nationwide Policy Statement of Work through the end of the FOIA
results, in 2020. 66 In all of those agreements, NQRP funding beyond the
ninety days would continue if the QR made a motion to withdraw due to
the lack of funding, and the judge denied that motion.
B.

Following the Money: An Examination of Billing Models and
Conditions on Providers

Franco and the Nationwide Policy billing models diverged with respect
to how attorneys could secure expert witnesses and how much a QR could
spend per case overall. Experts play an indispensable role in any
respondent’s effort to meet a complicated burden of proof while seeking
relief. Experts can be historians or sociologists who contextualize a
person’s asylum claim; medical experts who corroborate an applicant’s
physical experiences; or mental health experts who confirm an applicant’s
trauma, PTSD, or other mental health condition. They can also be costly
to enlist.
Contract documents show a different review ladder and justification
process for QRs in the two sides of the NQRP. Initially, all NQRP cases
(both Franco and the Nationwide Policy) were subject to a $6,000 per
case funding cap before an immigration court, and a $3,000 per case
funding cap before the BIA. 67 A singular, one-time provision of funding
at the same amount could be granted under “exceptional
circumstances”—but this funding was subject to final approval by
EOIR. 68 This second cap was final except in “rare, extraordinary, and
exigent circumstances – well in excess of the showing of ‘exceptional
circumstances’ required for a waiver of initial case caps – [when] the
Government may authorize additional funds . . . .” 69 EOIR had “sole and
unreviewable discretion” to grant such requests. 70
The per-case funding cap, however, would not endure in the Franco
half of the NQRP. When conducting a side-by-side analysis of the NQRP
Statement of Work for the 2016 fiscal year (governing NQRP cases
generally), versus that same fiscal year’s clarifying “Appendix A:
WORK 9 (Sept. 23, 2014) [hereinafter EOIR September 2014 Statement of Work] (on file with author)
(emphasis added).
66. See EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., NAT’L QUALIFIED REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM
STATEMENT OF WORK (2020) (on file with author); EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., NAT’L QUALIFIED
REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM STATEMENT OF WORK (2019) (on file with author).
67. EOIR September 2014 Statement of Work, supra note 65, at 12.
68. Id. at 12.
69. Id. at 12–13.
70. Id. at 13.
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Program Services Required Under Franco Gonzalez v. Holder,” EOIR
added that funding caps could not be imposed in such a manner that would
violate the district court’s orders in Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder. 71 In
practical terms, this meant that Franco QRs were not subject to per-case
funding caps at all, as the injunction required government-paid counsel
through the natural life of an incompetent respondent’s proceeding before
EOIR.
QRs were allowed a contractually agreed upon expert budget of
$2,100. 72 Experts were defined to include any professional who provided
an opinion on one or more issues relating to competency, claims for relief
before EOIR, or other aspects of the case. 73 A QR was “not to exceed
$2,100 per expert . . . barring exceptional circumstances and pending
EOIR approval.” 74 Court training session documents indicate “QRs must
apply for and receive pre-approval for expert funds” and that pre-approval
required QRs to “demonstrate the legal and factual justification for the
expert.” 75
Appendices to early program planning documents dating back to 2013
disclose the evaluation and approval process for all experts before a QR
could engage an expert. The first review was conducted by Vera; the QR
would submit an expert request form in which the QR had to justify the
expert’s added contribution to the case. 76 If an expert or expert fee
exceeded $2,100, EOIR’s Office of Legal Access Programs had to
approve the expense after a QR satisfactorily justified the need for
additional funds. 77
71. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., NAT’L QUALIFIED REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM STATEMENT OF
WORK app. A at 7 (2016).
72. See Memorandum from Vera Inst. of Just. on Proposal for National Qualified Representative
Program (QRP) app. D at 3 (Dec. 20, 2013) (on file with author).
73. Id. at 1.
74. See Memorandum from Vera Inst. of Just. on Proposal for National Qualified Representative
Program (QRP) app. C at 1 (Dec. 20, 2013) (on file with author) (emphasis added).
75. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., “Assessing Competence in Immigration Proceedings”, FOIA
REQUEST RESPONSE TO THE HARV. IMMIGR. & REFUGEE CLINICAL PROGRAM 307 (May 13, 2021)
(on file with author).
76. Memorandum from Vera Inst. of Just., supra note 72, at 1–2 (setting forth the parameters for
approval including that the QR had attempted to negotiate the best possible price to reduce the expert’s
fee(s), whether the QR had attempted to stipulate with DHS on the issue of fact or law that the expert
was going to address, and whether the expert was necessary to satisfy a legal element, burden of proof,
etc.).
77. Id. at 3 (“In cases where the proposed [expert] cost exceeds [$2,100] (or some other reasonable
amount), Vera may ask the QR to renegotiate the cost with the expert or provide additional
justification. If the complexity of the case is such that an expert will have to devote considerable time
and resources; that complexity is apparent from the application; and the anticipated costs in excess of
$2,100 appear to be sufficiently justified, Vera may approve the application without requiring
additional justification, after consulting with OLAP.” (emphasis added)).
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In 2018, the Franco funding structure shifted away from hourly billing
to a “fully-loaded,” fixed-price model that eliminated the need for QRs to
justify third-party (i.e., expert) fees and did not need to seek approval to
exceed the spending cap. 78 Instead, EOIR would pay one amount per case,
which was to include “all costs required to provide program services,”
including hourly attorney rates, interpreters, incidental costs, travel, etc. 79
Up through the last FOIA result (2020), the Franco QRs were offered
either an hourly billing model, or a “flat-rate” model. 80 Nationwide Policy
cases were fixed-rate only.
C.

Devil in the Details: Case Processing Deadlines, Hearing Types,
and Identification Tags for Franco vs. Nationwide Policy Cases

EOIR created handy “competence evaluation system in immigration
court” flowcharts: one for Franco and the other for the Nationwide
Policy. 81 Physically placing them side by side creates an illusion of
sameness. Both provide identical branching paths, the paths contain the
same steps, and they all contain the number of days in which the court
must complete each step. But on closer inspection, a major difference
becomes clear. While the Franco flowchart explains the process and
timing of a member’s bond hearing, the Nationwide flowchart makes no
mention of bond whatsoever.
A one-page EOIR training document makes this point even more
explicit. The document, entitled, “Differences between Franco & EOIR’s
Nationwide Policy,” 82 is simple and clean, juxtaposing the two sides of
the NQRP and their respective basic features. Two words jump out from
a line that compares the timelines for competency hearings, Competency
Reviews, and the provision of a QR under the NQRP. The deadlines are
“[r]equired” for the Franco column and “[a]spirational” for the

78. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., NAT’L QUALIFIED REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM STATEMENT OF
WORK 13 (2018) (on file with author).
79. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., NAT’L QUALIFIED REPRESENTATIVE PROGRAM STATEMENT OF
WORK 11 (2020) (on file with author).
80. Id.
81. FRANCO-GONZALEZ V. HOLDER COMPETENCE EVALUATION SYSTEM IN IMMIGRATION COURT,
supra note 48; NATIONWIDE POLICY: DHS SCREENING, INFORMATION-GATHERING, AND
INFORMATION-SHARING
SYSTEM,
https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/Nationwide-Policy-Flow-Chart.pdf [https://perma.cc/D35C-8EJE] (last
updated Mar. 19, 2015).
82. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FRANCO & EOIR’S NATIONWIDE
POLICY,
https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Differences-BetweenFranco-and-EOIRs-Nationwide-Policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/E3ZN-8M3F] (last updated Aug. 29,
2019).
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Nationwide Policy. 83
As for bond, a line item on the same one-page training document reads:
“Entitlement to a bond hearing after 180 days in detention?” 84 The Franco
column provides a simple “[y]es.” The Nationwide Policy column reads:
“No. Nationwide Policy does not create bond authority.” 85
EOIR provided the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical
Program (HIRC) with a massive spreadsheet in response to its request for
information relating to the “total number of ICE detainees where the
detainee received a Qualified Representative after the Immigration Judge
ordered it, and the date when the Qualified Representative was assigned
to the detainee.” 86 Under a column designated for bond hearings under a
tab entitled “Franco Master List,” all Nationwide Policy cases have “N/A”
in the field. 87
It is one thing to hypothesize that suggested deadlines (versus
mandated ones) may result in slower case processing, and quite another
to prove it with data. To shed some light on this question, I looked at
EOIR’s April 14, 2021 FOIA response to HIRC’s request for “[a]ll
information contained in the ‘Mental Competence’ or ‘MC’ section in
EOIR’s database, including information that tracks decisions and results
during the competency determination process, from the initial
identification of indicia of mental incompetence to the ultimate decision
on competence.” 88
This item contains precise dates for when important competency case
processing milestones were met nationwide: the date a judge held a JCI;
the date they requested a Forensic Competency Evaluation; the date that
the FCE evaluation was completed and submitted to the court; the date
that the IJ held a follow-up Competency Review after reviewing the FCE;
and finally, the date an IJ found a respondent incompetent and ordered a
QR.
For purity of sample, I isolated and compared only the cases where the
data was completely and fully provided (as in, there were no gaps or
obvious data entry errors 89), where an IJ ordered an FCE, and where a
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. SECOND FOIA REQUEST RESPONSE TO THE HARV. IMMIGR. & REFUGEE CLINICAL PROGRAM,
supra note 13.
87. Id. (appearing under column entitled “Bond Hearing with QR Between (Franco only)”).
88. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., THIRD FOIA REQUEST RESPONSE TO THE HARV. IMMIGR. &
REFUGEE CLINICAL PROGRAM (Apr. 14, 2021) (on file with author) [hereinafter THIRD FOIA
REQUEST RESPONSE].
89. An example of an obvious data entry error was where, in one case, a QR was ordered earlier in
time that a competency review took place, resulting in a negative number of days elapsed.
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respondent was in fact found incompetent at the conclusion of the
Competency Review. I then compared the number of average days it took
the Franco courts to complete each step, followed by the average number
of days it took the Nationwide Policy courts do to the same.
The results show that at nearly each stage of the competency process,
the Nationwide Policy cases took longer than the Franco cases. For
example, the average time that elapsed between when an IJ ordered a
Forensic Competency Evaluation and when it was submitted to the court
was thirty-one days for Franco cases. For Nationwide Policy cases, the
average was fifty-two days. Thereafter, the average number of days that
elapsed between when a Franco IJ received a doctor’s Forensic
Competency Review and when the IJ held the final Competency Review
was fourteen. For Nationwide Policy cases, that average was twenty-nine
days. It also took two days longer on average for a Nationwide Policy IJ
to order a QR. In the aggregate, the average time that elapsed between
when a Franco IJ held the first JCI until when the IJ found a respondent
incompetent and ordered a QR was fifty-four days. For Nationwide Policy
cases, that same process took on average ninety-two days. Put another
way, the Franco courts process competency cases in almost half the time
(41% faster).
One last small but important difference exists in Franco and
Nationwide Policy casefile identification tags. The Hoppock FOIA results
netted an inside peek into EOIR’s case “Case Manager” system, and
specifically, the “Competency Tab.” 90 These screenshots provide a
glimpse into how EOIR identifies and tracks all NQRP respondents.
There is an item entitled “Case Competency Tab Flowchart” that
contains a drop-down menu entitled “Franco Class Membership.” 91 In the
lower right-hand corner there is an instructional text-box that reminds the
user that a “Respondent remains a Franco class member even if found
competent, released, or transferred outside jurisdiction.” 92 There is no
corresponding “Nationwide Policy Membership” drop-down option. 93
The trainers explained that Nationwide Policy cases should always be
marked “no” under the “Franco Class Membership” drop-down menu. 94
Put another way, if a Franco respondent is released from custody or has
90. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., CASE COMPETENCY TAB FLOWCHART – NATIONWIDE,
https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Case-Competency-Tab-FlowchartNationwide.pdf [https://perma.cc/S3QJ-JPSX] (last updated Nov. 6, 2019).
91. Id. (“Franco Class Membership – should be marked ‘Yes’ (detained and unrepresented in AZ,
CA, or WA).”).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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their case transferred to a new jurisdiction, any court staff member—from
a BIA member to an IJ to a clerk to an administrative assistant—will
immediately see a “Franco” label in the database. If a Nationwide Policy
respondent is released or has their case transferred to a new jurisdiction,
there is no notification of any kind that the case involves (or once
involved) competency.
D.

Implementation and Training Gaps Between Franco and the
Nationwide Policy

Significant implementation differences also exist between Franco and
the Nationwide Policy. As revealed through EOIR’s FOIA responses, the
Nationwide Policy was slow to get off the ground as compared to Franco.
Also evident is that judges sitting in the Nationwide Policy courts received
less robust training than their counterparts in the Franco courts—and
receive it less often.
Based on the review of an EOIR spreadsheet that tracks decisions and
results during the competency determination process, it appears that the
first Franco QR was ordered on September 18, 2013. 95 The first
Nationwide Policy QR was ordered close to two years later, on September
15, 2015. 96
According to that same data tracker—which ends April 1, 2021—the
total number of times that an IJ or the BIA ordered a QR for a respondent
since the NQRP’s beginning was 1,760. 97 Of that, 1,230 orders were for
Franco respondents, and 530 were for Nationwide Policy respondents. 98
This disparity is surprising, given that the majority of detainees in the
United States are held outside the three Franco states in the Ninth
Circuit. 99 More detainees are currently held in Georgia and Texas, for
example, than any other state. 100
What might explain the lagging Nationwide Policy case numbers is that
until August 2020, the Nationwide Policy was only operational in twenty95. THIRD FOIA REQUEST RESPONSE, supra note 88.
96. Id.
97. Id. (examining a column entitled “QROrder” by the response “True,” or alternatively, the
column entitled “QROrderDate,” arriving at the same result).
98. Id. (tallying the results from the column entitled “FrancoClassMemberIndicator” where the
answer is “True” and the respondent was adjudicated incompetent).
FREEDOM
FOR
IMMIGRANTS,
99. Mapping
U.S.
Immigration
Detention,
https://www.freedomforimmigrants.org/map [https://perma.cc/D6TT-XNYA] (last visited May 3,
2022).
IMMIGR.,
100. Detention
Facilities
Average
Daily
Population,
TRAC
https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/detentionstats/facilities.html [https://perma.cc/R7V8-ATXT] (last
visited May 3, 2022).

Wilson (Do Not Delete)

40

8/18/2022 4:48 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW ONLINE

[Vol. 97:21

one detained courts. 101 Contrast that with the NQRP’s complete rollout in
every immigration court in Arizona, California and Washington that hears
detained cases by 2014.
The FOIA results suggest that Nationwide Policy IJs receive weaker
and less frequent competency training as compared to the Franco IJs on
how to identify possible mental incompetency and how to proceed
thereafter. A confidential “Notice to Immigration Judges Regarding
Applicability of Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder in Cases Involving Mental
Incompetence” 102 states that while all judges are trained to “identify and
detect indicia of mental incompetence” in respondents appearing in
immigration court, judges presiding over cases in Arizona, California or
Washington “will receive additional, detailed training specific to the
procedures and protections required by the Permanent Injunction and
Implementation Order issued in Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder.” 103 Put
another way, EOIR created a two-tiered training system from the outset
of the district court’s directive.
Additional evidence that IJs sitting within the Franco courts were given
more comprehensive, robust training is found in an April 2021
PowerPoint. There, EOIR’s Office of General Counsel reminded judges
that if they were in a Franco jurisdiction they would receive “an additional
full-day Franco IJ mental competency training . . . .” 104
Training data confirms the inconsistent education of Nationwide Policy
IJs. EOIR provided HIRC with spreadsheets on July 20, 2021, relating to
the competency training of 596 IJs. 105 Of those 596 IJs, 193 were
identified as being specifically affiliated with the Nationwide Policy 106

101. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., EOIR’S NATIONWIDE POLICY TO PROVIDE ENHANCED
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS TO UNREPRESENTED DETAINED ALIENS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL
DISORDERS
OR
CONDITIONS,
https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/EOIRs-Nationwide-Policy-list-of-courts.pdf
[https://perma.cc/46NL4S7K] (last updated Aug. 2020).
102. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., NOTICE TO IMMIGRATION JUDGES REGARDING APPLICABILITY
FRANCO-GONZALEZ V. HOLDER IN CASES INVOLVING MENTAL INCOMPETENCE,
https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Confidential-IJ-Guidance-reFranco-Gonzalez-Settlement.pdf [https://perma.cc/HDD4-Y47B].

OF

103. Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
104. JAMES F. MCCARTHY, III & BRIANNA EVANS, DETERMINING MENTAL COMPETENCE &
SAFEGUARDS & PROTECTIONS 11 (Apr. 5–23, 2021), https://www.hoppocklawfirm.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/April-2021-Powerpoint-on-Competency-Evaluation-Policy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UG72-42D8].
105. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., FOIA REQUEST RESPONSE TO THE HARV. IMMIGR. & REFUGEE
CLINICAL PROGRAM (July 20, 2021) (on file with author).
106. Id. This number was achieved by reviewing the spreadsheet’s tab entitled “Non Franco
Judges,” then counting only IJs listed as “NWP” under Column G, “Franco/NWP/M-A-M.”
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(among whom 162 appeared to be actively hearing cases). 107
The data shows that training of the judges in the Nationwide Policy
contains significant gaps. Only 79 of the active 162 Nationwide Policy
judges, or 49% of them, received an “Initial Competency Training.” 108
Eight Nationwide Policy IJs are listed as “need NWP Training”, 109 and
only seven IJs (less than 5% of the total Nationwide Policy IJs), received
a “refresher” training. 110Equally concerning is that of the 252 IJs
identified as “M-A-M-” IJs 111—meaning, those handling a non-detained
docket—165, or 65%, of them—are identified under a sheet entitled “IJ’s
need NWP Training.” 112
Woven through correspondence between Vera and EOIR’s Office of
Legal Access Programs are hints of EOIR’s preoccupation with the
Franco side of the NQRP and its neglectfulness of the Nationwide Policy.
Vera urges EOIR, for example, to invest in increased stakeholder
meetings and site visits throughout the Nationwide Policy locations. 113
Site visits, Vera states, “help facilitate, troubleshoot, and enhance
program operations” through educating court personnel, DHS, and
detention facility contractors about the program’s main features. 114 Such
measures could help EOIR “identify and resolve systemic issues.” 115
Vera implies that Franco benefits from a more hands-on approach from

107. Id. Judges were excluded from the analysis if, under the “Non Franco Judges” tab’s Column
U “Notes,” they were identified as having retired or resigned (ten IJs), as having left the agency (five
IJs), or as having passed away (one IJ). I also excluded the fifteen Assistant Chief Immigration Judges,
who hold supervisory rather than adjudicatory roles, from the tabulation. The Assistant Chief
Immigration Judges were spotted by looking under Column D, “Position,” and organizing each judge
by title.
108. Id. This number was achieved by reviewing the spreadsheet’s tab entitled “Non Franco
Judges,” isolating those judges under Column G, “Franco/NWP/M-A-M,” who are listed as “NWP,”
and then organizing those judges by the date that they received a training per Column H, “Initial
Competency Training.”
109. Id. This number was achieved by examining the spreadsheet’s tab entitled “IJ’s need NWP
Training,” organizing Column G, “Franco/NWP/M-A-M,” by “NWP,” and seeing that eight IJs were
listed: Judges Tijerina, Castaneda, Newaz, Page, Pierro, Watters, Drucker, and Santander.
110. FOIA REQUEST RESPONSE, supra note 105. This number was discovered by examining the
spreadsheet’s tab entitled “Non-Franco Judges,” isolating all active “NWP” IJs, and identifying who
received a refresher training per Column K, “Refresher (NWP).”
111. Id. This number was achieved by reviewing the spreadsheet’s tab entitled “Non Franco
Judges,” then counting only IJs listed as “M-A-M” under Column G, “Franco/NWP/M-A-M.”
112. Id. This figure was discovered by looking at the spreadsheet’s tab entitled “IJ’s need NWP
Training,” organizing Column G, “Franco/NWP/M-A-M” by “M-A-M,” and counting the resulting
IJs who are listed as needing training.
113. Memorandum from Mike Corradini, et. al., Vera Inst. of Just., to Steve Lang, EXEC. OFF. FOR
IMMIGR. REV. (Mar. 18, 2016) (on file with author).
114. Id.at 1.
115. Id.
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EOIR. “EOIR prioritizes resolution” of issues within Franco, trains every
Franco IJ on how to process competency cases, and ensures that “judge[s]
and court staf[f] adher[e] to Franco requirements” 116 The Nationwide
Policy does not enjoy such close monitoring. 117
III. WHY THE DIFFERENCES MATTER, AND TO WHOM
The differences between Franco and the Nationwide Policy laid out
above may seem negligible, but they are extremely consequential to
incompetent respondents, their attorneys, and the courts that hear their
cases.
A.

The 90-Day Funding Limitation: Injurious, Nonsensical, and
Contrary to the NQRP’s Mission

As a threshold matter, the 90-day funding limit—which terminates
funding for Nationwide Policy cases 90 days after an incompetent
respondent’s release from ICE custody— risks severing this extremely
vulnerable population from counsel before the conclusion of their
proceedings. Given the extreme vulnerability of this population, indeed
the same population the NQRP is pledged to safeguard, this detail is
hugely problematic.
Virtually no case before an immigration court—even a detained,
expedited one—resolves in 90 days. Our immigration court system just
reached a historic high of 1.6 million pending cases, 118 and cases take over
three years on average to reach a final adjudication. 119 A three-month
period barely suffices to conduct life-saving post-release work such as
housing assistance or applying for much needed medical services, let
alone conclude a case.
Respondents with certain mental health concerns, for example,
116. FOIA REQUEST RESPONSE, supra note 105, at 2.
117. Order Appointing Katherine Mahoney as Monitor, Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 10CV02211 (C.D. Cal. March 2, 2015) at 2, https://www.aclusocal.org/sites/default/files/wpcontent/uploads/2015/05/ORD.DCT_.810-Order-Appointing-Katherine-Mahoney-as-Monitor.pdf
(granting the Franco compliance Monitor “the authority to monitor compliance with the Permanent
Injunction” [Doc. # 593] (“Permanent Injunction”) and the Order Further Implementing this Court’s
Permanent Injunction [Doc. # 786] (“Implementation Plan Order”) (collectively, “the Implementation
Documents”) (emphasis added).
118. Immigration Court Backlog Now Growing Faster Than Ever, Burying Judges in an Avalanche
of Cases, TRAC IMMIGR. (Jan. 18, 2022), https://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/675/
[https://perma.cc/3CEE-3BN7].
119. Average Time Pending Cases Have Been Waiting in Immigration Courts as of February 2022,
IMMIGR.,
TRAC
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/apprep_backlog_avgdays.php (last visited
April 27, 2022).
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paranoid personality disorder, may have a hard time forming trusting
relationships. 120 For respondents like these, losing their QR might be
disorienting or even psychologically harmful. Other respondents may not
understand or remember that their attorney is no longer defending them,
and in turn, detrimentally rely on their no-longer-present attorney to file
necessary court documents or applications, or to tell them of future
hearing dates. Individuals with serious mental health disabilities are more
likely to experience housing insecurity, 121 which may in turn cause them
to miss a hearing notice mailed to their last known address. Failure to
appear in court could trigger an in abstentia removal order, 122 re-detention
by ICE, and ultimately, deportation. 123
The ninety-day funding termination most absurdly militates against the
respondent being released from detention, where they risk being
unrepresented, and in favor of remaining in detention where they at least
have the benefit of counsel. 124
QRs are also harmed by the ninety-day funding limit. They are placed
in the ethically fraught position of having to either abandon their clients
after ninety days due to budget constraints or continue in their
representation pro bono at the expense of other potential clients. Most

120. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM–5; American
Psychiatric
Association,
2013)
649-650,
http://repository.poltekkeskaltim.ac.id/657/1/Diagnostic%20and%20statistical%20manual%20of%20mental%20disorders%20
_%20DSM-5%20%28%20PDFDrive.com%20%29.pdf (“The essential feature of paranoid
personality disorder is a pattern of pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others such that their
motives are interpreted as malevolent . . . . Individuals with paranoid personality disorder are
reluctant to confide in or become close to others because they fear that the information they share will
be used against them (Criterion A3).”).
121. Lilanthi Balasuriya, Eliza Buelt & Jack Tsai, The Never-Ending Loop: Homelessness,
(May
29,
2020),
Psychiatric
Disorder,
and
Mortality,
PSYCHIATRIC TIMES
https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/view/never-ending-loop-homelessness-psychiatric-disorder-andmortality [https://perma.cc/7A4D-LQVV].
122. 8 CFR § 1241.1(e) (“An order of removal made by the immigration judge at the conclusion of
proceedings under section 240 of the Act shall become final . . . If an immigration judge orders an
alien removed in the alien’s absence . . . .”); INGRID EAGLY & STEVEN SHAFER, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL, MEASURING IN ABSENTIA REMOVAL IN IMMIGRATION COURT 18 (2021),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/measuring_in_absentia_in
_immigration_court.pdf [https://perma.cc/4X9S-WKNH] (showing that respondents with counsel
appeared for their court hearings 96% of the time).
123. Immigr. Cust. Enforc., Removal, https://www.ice.gov/remove/removal (“ICE ERO removes
noncitizens from the United States who are subject to a final order of removal. ERO facilitates the
processing of undocumented noncitizens through the immigration court system and coordinates their
departure from the United States.”).
124. INGRID EAGLY & STEVEN SHAFER, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN
IMMIGRATION
COURT
15–20
(2016),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/access_to_counsel_in_im
migration_court.pdf [perma.cc/JV78-G459].
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QRs work in nonprofit legal service organizations, 125 where funding is
already scarce. Burnout, secondary trauma, and quality of life concerns
permeant the practice, particularly for nonprofit attorneys. 126 It is unfair
to force QRs into a position where they must continue representing a
client, but without compensation. The funding termination also creates a
conflict of interest between a QR’s best interest (compensation) and their
client’s best interest (release from detention).
Further, forcing a QR to identify and secure alternative legal counsel
for their NQRP clients is unrealistic, overly cumbersome, and unlikely to
succeed. Yet, each Nationwide Policy subcontractor application asks that
the provider describe their “capacity for utilizing and facilitating pro bono
representation and other pro bono services for NQRP clients who are no
longer eligible for Program Services . . . .” 127
Some QR organizations are large and well-funded, and avowed that
they had the capacity to absorb the cost and continue representation
beyond the 90-day funding period. 128 Other organizations were located in
underserved and geographically remote regions where legal resources are
already stretched thin. As one Nationwide Policy QR provider in New
Orleans stated in their 2019 application: “one of the main deterrents to pro
bono representation for detained immigrants is the location of the
detention facilities (typically about 3-4 hours from major metropolitan
centers) . . . .” 129 They stated that their strategy would be to solicit pro
bono case placement with large firms and private practitioners. Another
provider in rural Pennsylvania, however, avowed they simply “[did] not
have the staffing capacity to represent non-detained respondents in
removal proceedings . . . .” 130
The efficacy of the courts is diminished by the 90-day funding rule as
well. EOIR itself acknowledged that immigration judges are hampered in
“carry[ing] out their adjudicatory duties” when forced to proceed against

125. EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., FOIA REQUEST RESPONSE TO THE HARV. IMMIGR. & REFUGEE
CLINICAL PROGRAM (Aug. 12, 2021) (on file with author) (providing a complete list of QRs and
organizations).
126. Lindsay Harris & Hillary Mellinger, Asylum Attorney Burnout and Secondary Trauma, 56
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733 (2021).
127. VERA INST. OF JUST., FY2019 NQRP Supplemental Program Operation Plan (SPOP),
Nationwide Policy Providers, New Orleans, app. B at 4 (Feb. 26, 2019) (on file with author).
128. VERA INST. OF JUST., FY2020 NQRP Supplemental Program Operation Plan (SPOP),
Nationwide Policy Providers, Chicago, app. B at 3 (Aug. 15, 2019) (on file with author).
129. VERA INST. OF JUST., FY2019 NQRP Supplemental Program Operation Plan (SPOP),
Nationwide Policy Providers, New Orleans, app. B at 4 (Feb. 26, 2019) (on file with author).
130. VERA INST. OF JUST., FY2020 NQRP Supplemental Program Operation Plan (SPOP),
Nationwide Policy Providers, York, app. B at 3 (Oct. 29, 2019) (on file with author).
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pro se respondents with mental health concerns. 131 IJs overwhelmingly
agreed in a 2011 survey that cases move more efficiently when a
respondent is represented by counsel. 132 Having an attorney present
promotes judicial economy by reducing the number of continuances and
by accelerating key procedural stages such as pleadings and tendering of
relief. 133
B.

Bad for Business: How the NQRP’s Billing Structures Create
Conflicts of Interest and False Choices

Both the hourly billing and fixed-rate funding structures employed by
EOIR are problematic.
The advantage of hourly billing is that a provider is fully compensated
for the work they perform—unless there is (as here) an uppermost cap.
Hourly billing also allows a QR organization to bill for paralegal, social
worker, interpreter, and support staff time.
The hourly billing funding structure has disadvantages as well. For
example, it was wholly inappropriate for EOIR—the agency that
adjudicates immigration law cases and which occupies the role of a
neutral arbiter—to know of, review, and then approve or deny any aspect
of a legal representative’s defense strategy. It is equally problematic that,
under this model, a QR must justify the pursuit of certain evidence (e.g.,
the use of an expert). Such contractual features place counsel in a
subordinate position to EOIR while subverting the integrity and
independence of the public defender model.
EOIR might counter that the component responsible for adjudicating a
QR’s billing requests (the Office of Legal Access Programs) is separate
from the component that adjudicates the actual merits of the case (the
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge). But such organizational nuances
are not intuitive or widely known—and regardless, the process creates an
appearance of impropriety and risks intimidating counsel.
Another disadvantage to hourly billing is that nonprofit providers are
unable to budget over the long-term and are therefore unable to hire
131. EOIR Policy Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1(“For those of you who have had unrepresented
detained aliens with serious mental disorders or conditions appear in your courtrooms, you are more
than aware of the many unique challenges encountered in conducting removal proceedings involving
such individuals.”).
132. LENNI B. BENSON & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ENHANCING QUALITY AND TIMELINESS IN
IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJUDICATION 56 (2012)(“Our survey asked judges about their agreement
with this statement: ‘When the respondent has a competent lawyer, I can conduct the adjudication
more efficiently and quickly.’ Of the 166 judges who responded, ninety-two percent (92%) agreed
(sixty-nine percent (69%) “strongly”); five percent (5%) selected ‘neutral’.”).
133. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration
Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 59 (2015).
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permanent staff. This is especially true in the Nationwide Policy, where
funding ends ninety days after a client’s release from ICE custody.
The flat-rate system EOIR adopted in 2018 appears, at first blush, to be
an improvement. At a minimum, EOIR is no longer reviewing a QR’s
litigation decision-making. The flat-rate system also gives providers the
security of a long-term contract while allowing them to staff appropriately
over a given year. It does not, however, account for extreme case
fluctuations, such as where a released Franco member’s case endures for
years and requires multiple court appearances, or where a respondent has
criminal convictions and requires expensive, lengthy post-conviction
relief. And finally, a flat-rate system encourages cost containment over
quality by creating incentives to move cases out quickly rather than fully
litigate them.
The hourly billing versus flat-rate models presents Franco QRs with a
Hobson’s Choice—but a choice, nevertheless. The Nationwide Policy
QRs are not even allowed that; they are confined to a flat-rate
arrangement.
C.

Timing Really Is Everything: Constitutional Deprivations for
Nationwide Policy Respondents

Timing differences between the Nationwide Policy versus Franco
courts 134 implicate detainees’ liberty interest. With no pressure on the
Nationwide Policy immigration courts to comply with the strict mandates
of Franco—and with EOIR’s own training materials telling judges that
competency timeframes are “aspirational” 135—respondents face
prolonged and unnecessary detention periods. As demonstrated through
an analysis of the case processing times between the two sides of the
program, unenforced timing deadlines mean that respondents languish
longer in harmful ICE custody. 136
The fact that Nationwide Policy respondents are not entitled to a
custody review with a QR present after an incompetence determination is
utterly illogical and violates EOIR’s own stated policy. 137 In practical
terms, and as articulated by the district court in Franco, an incompetence
determination means that any prior bond hearing without a QR present is
effectively invalid and must be done again with counsel by the

134. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
135. Supra note 82 and accompanying text.
136. Supra Part II.C and accompanying text.
137. See EOIR Policy Memorandum, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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incompetent respondent’s side. 138 To not permit a Nationwide Policy
respondent a new bond hearing with counsel present is to adhere the first
bond hearing’s validity—when in fact it should have been invalidated as
a matter of law by the subsequent incompetence ruling.
Additionally, detained proceedings are expensive for the courts and
ICE, 139 especially as the cost to detain a single individual is around $140
a day. 140 More importantly, longer detention times are harmful to
respondents who risk decompensation, 141 self-harm, 142 solitary
confinement, 143 or inadequate and inappropriate care for their mental
health concerns. 144
EOIR’s failure to permanently track Nationwide Policy respondents as
they do their Franco respondents risks harming respondents in two ways.
First, Nationwide Policy respondents caught anywhere between an IJ’s
bona fide doubt finding and a competency hearing risk unlawful
deportation. They run this risk if they either accept their own removal
138. Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 10-CV02211, Partial Judgment and Permanent Injunction of
Apr. 23, 2013, 4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2013) (“That a Sub-Class Two member has had a prior bond
hearing shall not be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this Order and Judgment unless that bond
hearing complied with the requirements of Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011). For SubClass Two members who are also Sub-Class One members, the individual must also have been
represented by a Qualified Representative at that hearing.” (emphasis added)); see also Franco v.
Gonzalez v. Holder Case Processing and Logistics – Quick Reference, SIXTH FOIA REQUEST
RESPONSE TO THE HARV. IMMIGR. & REFUGEE CLINICAL PROGRAM (June 1, 2021) (on file with
author) (“A Franco class member is entitled to a bond hearing after 180 days in detention, and with
their QR present after being found incompetent, even if they were previously provided with a bond
hearing.”).
139. See Eagly & Shafer, supra note 133, at 60.
140. AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE UNITED STATES BY AGENCY 6
(2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/immigration_detention_in
_the_united_states_by_agency.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G3D-LKNL].
141. E. FULLER TORREY, JOAN STIEBER, JONATHAN EZEKIEL, SIDNEY M. WOLFE, JOSHUA
SHARFSTEIN, JOHN H. NOBLE & LAURIE M. FLYNN., NAT’L ALL. FOR THE MENTALLY ILL & PUBLIC
CITIZEN’S HEALTH RSCH. GRP., CRIMINALIZING THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL: THE ABUSE OF
JAILS AS MENTAL HOSPITALS 62–64 (providing testimonials from impacted individuals and their
families regarding a severe psychiatric and medical deterioration during periods of incarceration).
142. Id. at 61 (referencing studies that find approximately half of all inmate suicides are committed
by persons suffering from serious mental health disorders).
143. AZZA ABUDAGGA, SIDNEY WOLFE, MICHAEL CAROME, AMANDA PHATDUOANG & E.
FULLER TORREY, PUBLIC CITIZEN’S HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP & THE TREATMENT ADVOCACY
CTR., INDIVIDUALS WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESSES IN COUNTY JAILS: A SURVEY OF JAIL STAFF’S
PERSPECTIVES 11–12 (2016) (surveying jails around the U.S., nearly 70% of which reported
segregating individuals with serious mental health disabilities).
144. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., MANY FACTORS HINDER ICE’S
ABILITY TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE MEDICAL STAFFING AT DETENTION FACILITIES (2021),
https://www.oig.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/assets/2021-11/OIG-22-03-Oct21.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3ET6-HGC9].
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order proposed by ICE or withdraw their request to see an immigration
judge—acts they may not be competent to do.
Second, if a Nationwide Policy respondent is released from detention
prior to the conclusion of their competency proceedings, none of the class
membership benefits adhere to their casefile as they would if the
respondent was identified as Franco. 145 This means that, despite possibly
being incompetent, they will never have the benefit of appointed
counsel. 146
Instead, released respondents will have their competency evaluated
under the Matter of M-A-M- standard 147—which is a lower competency
standard than that set out in Franco. 148 It is easier to be competent under
M-A-M- because M-A-M- requires that a respondent perform fewer
functions than Franco requires in order to be competent. 149 And, because
IJs applying M-A-M- do not have the authority to order a forensic
competency evaluation to assist them in understanding a respondent’s
mental condition, 150 more respondents will fall through the cracks.
D.

A Hard Enough Job as It Is: Inconsistent Training Imperils EOIR
as a Whole

The NQRP is complicated—not only in terms of case processing, but
because adjudicating competence for a neurologically diverse range of
respondents is extremely challenging in and of itself. Untrained or
inadequately trained court staff might account for slowed case

145. Supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text.
146. Supra note 7 and accompanying text.
147. Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. (BIA 2011) at 479 (“[T]he test for determining whether an
[individual] is competent to participate in immigration proceedings is whether he or she has a rational
and factual understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings, can consult with the attorney
or representative if there is one, and has a reasonable opportunity to examine and present evidence
and cross-examine witnesses.”).
148. See EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., PowerPoint: Determining Mental Competence &
Safeguards & Protections (Aug. 5-23, 2021) (on file with the author), at slide 6 (“M-A-M- applies to
any case where there is indicia that the respondent lacks competency, but Franco and the Nationwide
Policy would not apply.”).
149. Franco Implementation Order, supra note 35 at 13–14 (holding that a respondent must not
only have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings, but also be able to make informed
decisions about whether to waive their rights, respond to allegations and charges, present information
and evidence relevant to eligibility for relief, and act upon instructions and information presented by
the IJ and government counsel).
150. See EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., PowerPoint: Determining Mental Competence &
Safeguards & Protections (Aug. 5-23, 2021) (on file with the author), at slide 13 (“Actions an IJ
Cannot Take under M-A-M- . . . Order that a psychologist conduct an evaluation of the
respondent . . . .”).
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processing, 151 a disproportionately low rate of QR orders in the
Nationwide Policy regions, 152 and slow programmatic rollout. 153
Increased case processing times unduly burdens an already bowing
immigration court system.
Failure to adequately train immigration judges to identify and treat
competency in their courtrooms implicates due process concerns; if an IJ
fails to fully evaluate or understand a respondent’s mental health
concerns, there is a risk that a respondent with disabilities will fall outside
the NQRP’s scope and will therefore be deprived of their constitutional
right to a fair hearing with counsel by their side.
First, as EOIR assumes a new contractual relationship with its next
partner, it must eliminate the ninety-day funding limitation for nonFranco cases. It is fundamentally unfair to proceed against an
unrepresented incompetent respondent—regardless of their detention
status—and respondents’ due process and statutory rights must be
guaranteed during the entire pendency of their proceeding as long as
incompetency continues. The ninety-day limitation is harmful to
respondents who now risk proceeding pro se, harmful to QRs who must
make ethically fraught and unfair choices related to their continued
representation, and harmful to the judicial economy of the courts.
Second, EOIR should change its compensation model to enable QR
subcontractors to elect—according to their institutional needs—hourly or
flat-rate billing. Further, EOIR should eliminate funding caps and line of
review by its main contractor. This compensation structure removes
conflicts of interest while promoting the financial health of the QR
organizations.
Third, EOIR must safeguard the liberty interests of Nationwide Policy
respondents by imposing strict adherence to the case timetables and
obligations laid out in Franco to shorten detention periods. This will move
cases forward more consistently and quickly, while promoting the liberty
interests of respondents with mental health concerns.
Fourth, EOIR must finally fulfill its promise to provide all detained,
mentally incompetent respondents with a custody review after 180 days
of detention. Any prior bond hearing without counsel was invalid, as in
Franco, and must be conducted anew with a QR by the respondent’s side.
Finally, EOIR should tackle the enormity of its training gaps by simply
introducing a designated “competency docket” in each court. If an IJ
determines that a respondent’s competency is implicated, they would refer
151. Supra notes 99–105 and accompanying text.
152. Supra notes 81–88 and accompanying text.
153. Id.
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that case to a specialized weekly calendar presided over by a small group
of IJs with expertise in competency. Those IJs would receive regular,
intensified training on the complex and shifting nature of mental health
and its intersection with immigration law. Upon completion of the
competency evaluation process, the case would return to the original IJ
for adjudication on the merits. A designated competency docket would
create transparency for the public, promote judicial economy by reducing
scheduling delays, and eliminate the need for large-scale, EOIR-wide
judge training and refresher courses.
EOIR has successfully created designated dockets for other groups—
such as families and unaccompanied children—and has seen the benefits
of concentrating and developing expertise among a select number of
judges for a discreet population.
Adding a “Nationwide Policy” identification label to each respondent’s
internal case file will ensure that future courts—from non-detained
dockets to the BIA—are aware the respondent requires counsel before
further action, and that the case needs to be placed on the competency
designated docket rather than with an undertrained or untrained IJ.
CONCLUSION
The above recommendations are emergency and “stopgap” in nature.
Our immigration system is far from being just, complete, and humane for
those with mental health disabilities. For example, this article does not
begin to discuss the problems with Franco as a whole, and specifically,
those who are entirely left behind by the Franco court order. Nor does this
article add to abolitionist conversations, which promote the dismantling
of our detention and deportation systems rather than the incremental
improvement of them.
Suggesting alterations to the Nationwide Policy does not validate the
systems that exist but ameliorates some of the harm created by them in
practical, attainable ways. Measures such as eliminating funding limits,
allowing bond hearings for all detained incompetent respondents,
addressing gaps in immigration judge training, and applying a consistent
case tracking and case processing system across the United States will
offer immediate gains for noncitizens with mental health disabilities and
can be pursued alongside long-term goals of repairing our damaged
immigration landscape.

